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Abstract If philosophical moral reflection improves moral behavior, one might
expect ethics professors to behave morally better than socially similar non-ethicists.
Under the assumption that forms of political engagement such as voting have moral
worth, we looked at the rate at which a sample of professional ethicists—and political
philosophers as a subgroup of ethicists—voted in eight years’ worth of elections. We
compared ethicists’ and political philosophers’ voting rates with the voting rates of
three other groups: philosophers not specializing in ethics, political scientists, and a
comparison group of professors specializing in neither philosophy nor political
science. All groups voted at about the same rate, except for the political scientists,
who voted about 10–15% more often. On the face of it, this finding conflicts with the
expectation that ethicists will behave more responsibly than non-ethicists.
What is the relationship between philosophical moral reflection and real-world moral
behavior? Does reflecting philosophically on moral questions lead us to act better?
Though the question is central to both moral psychology and moral education, it has
never been systematically explored. In this and related articles we plan to make a start.
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Certain practices and institutions seem to operate on the assumption that
philosophical moral reflection tends to have a positive impact on moral behavior.
Philosophical courses in medical, legal, and business ethics are required,
presumably, in part on the assumption that philosophical reflection on those applied
moral issues will, down the road, help improve the behavior of budding doctors,
lawyers, and tycoons. Philosophers interested in doing what’s right—for example, in
deciding whether to become vegetarian or whether to go through the trouble of
voting on election day—sometimes reflect philosophically, considering consequen-
ces, virtues, or the universalizability of maxims, apparently under the assumption
that such reflection will help guide them toward the good. Although the value of
such reflective practices doesn’t strictly require that philosophical moral reflection
tends to improve moral behavior—for example, there might be better and worse
ways of reflecting, producing a net neutral result—the general acceptance of such
practices at least invites that supposition (a supposition apparently shared by
Aristotle, Kant, and Mill, among others: Aristotle 4th c. BCE/1962, 1103b; Kant
1785/1998, 4:404–5; Mill 1859/2003, ch. 2). If philosophical moral reflection has no
tendency to further the aim of acting well, that problematizes the role of such
reflection in everyday life.
Both real-world moral behavior and genuine philosophical moral reflection are
recondite, difficult to control, and (as targets of study) fraught with methodological
peril. Their relationship, therefore, is difficult to examine. Psychologists have put
forward models according to which explicit moral reasoning of the sort encouraged
by philosophers either stands near the center of morality (e.g., Kohlberg 1984) or
serves mainly to rationalize moral intuitions arrived at prior to reflection (e.g., Haidt
2001), but direct empirical evidence is thin and the question remains wide open. One
potential line of evidence that remains untapped is the moral behavior of ethics
professors. If philosophical reflection does promote moral behavior, either generally
speaking or in a broad range of cases, one might expect that philosophers, especially
moral philosophers, would tend to behave better than other people, since presumably
they are both prone to such reflection and skilled at it.
The best way to determine the moral impact of a lifetime’s philosophical
reflection on ethics would be to randomly assign children either to careers in ethics
or to other academic careers, then measure their virtue in adulthood using a
moralometer. However, since the moralometer has yet to be invented, and since
random assignment to careers would require an authoritarian dystopia, we’ll have to
settle for more modest questions and more limited measures—which we believe can
collectively illuminate the broader issues. The present study begins with the
assumption that forms of political engagement such as voting have moral worth, and
examines the voting frequency of four groups of professors: ethicists (including
political philosophers as a subgroup), philosophers not specializing in ethics,
political science professors, and a comparison group of professors from other
departments. The key question is, do ethicists and political philosophers execute this
civic duty more reliably than other professors?
We assume that most ethical theories imply that participation in a representative
democracy, including voting in public elections, is in general morally preferable to non-
participation. John Stuart Mill writes glowingly of the moral benefits that flow from
political participation (1861/2006). Aristotle envisions political involvement as an
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important part of the virtuous life (4th c. BCE/1962, 4th c. BCE/1998). Although Kant
himself is not entirely clear on the value of representative democracy (1795/1996),
more recent deontologists endorse the value of participation and voting. Rawls, for
example, writes that citizens are “expected to vote” and that even independently of its
direct contribution to justice, voting “leads to a larger conception of society and to the
development of... intellectual and moral faculties” on which the “stability of just
institutions depends” (1971, p. 234). We recognize, of course, that some people have
excellent reason not to vote either in general or on particular occasions and that the
question of whether voting is a duty, or whether it is contrary to rational choice theory,
or both, is a topic of debate among political scientists and political philosophers (e.g.,
Downs 1957; Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974; Parfit 1984; Lomasky and Brennan 2000).
However, we suspect that most cases of non-participation represent a choice of
individual goods over societal ones—a small moral failure in conscientious
citizenship, a failure perfectly compatible with moral excellence in many other
respects but a failure nonetheless. If philosophical moral reflection has a positive
impact on moral behavior, then, one might predict that ethicists, perhaps especially
political philosophers (who in the U.S. tend to reflect on and prize democratic
institutions), would vote more often than non-ethicists of similar social background.
Of course morality and immorality are too diverse, multi-faceted, covert,
situationally malleable, and contentious to be captured by a single measure or even
a small group of measures. So this study, considered alone, can illuminate only a
small corner of the larger question motivating this research. We do not pretend that
conscientiousness in voting is by itself an accurate index of overall moral behavior
(especially given the concerns of “situationists” in social psychology such as Ross
and Nisbett 1991; Doris 2002). We do hope, however, that a diverse range of studies,
viewed jointly, may reveal an overall pattern. Voting is therefore just one measure
among several we are exploring to assess the relationship between the professional
study of ethics and everyday moral behavior—others include looking at the rates at
which ethics books are missing from academic libraries (Schwitzgebel 2009), rates
of donation to charity (Schwitzgebel and Rust in preparation), peer assessments of
overall moral behavior (Schwitzgebel and Rust forthcoming), and responsiveness to
email queries from undergraduate students (Rust and Schwitzgebel in preparation).
Among moral behaviors, voting is particularly amenable to study for two reasons:
First, it’s a matter of public record whether a person has voted, so we needn’t rely on
self-report or direct observation. The latter are methodologically problematic,
especially regarding the moral behavior of as sophisticated and sparsely distributed
a group as professional ethicists. And second, for the U.S. professors who are the
target of this study, the opportunity to vote is presumably equally distributed among
the comparison groups, eliminating a variety of potential confounds.
In casual conversation, most of the people we’ve spoken to—although
interestingly few political scientists—predicted that political scientists would vote
more often than other professors. People were more divided about what to expect
from ethics professors. A majority, perhaps, expressed the view that ethicists would
be no more conscientious in this matter than other professors. This skepticism
mirrors the more general skepticism about the behavior of ethicists we’ve found in
other research (Schwitzgebel and Rust forthcoming). We aim to see if this skepticism
is justified, at least with respect to voting.
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Existing studies of professors’ voting rates are old and either very limited or
based on self-report, and none look at ethicists or political philosophers specifically
(Joyner 1963; Yee 1963; Turner and Spaulding 1969; Turner and Hetrick 1972;
Creason 1978; Roettger and Winebrenner 1983). Although both psychologists and
philosophers sometimes discuss the relationship between moral reflection and moral
behavior (in psychology, see Kohlberg 1984; Haidt 2001; and the reactions to them;
in philosophy, see Plato’s Apology, Protagoras, and Meno in 4th c. BCE/1997;
Aristotle 4th c. BCE/1962; Kant 1785/1998; Mill 1859/2003; Moody-Adams 1997;
Nussbaum 1997, 2007; Posner 1999), we are aware of no published empirical
studies of the moral behavior of ethicists.
1 Method
We compiled lists of professors from university websites in five U.S. states:
California, Florida, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Washington State. We chose
these states for the ease of access to public voting records—records of whether
individuals have voted, not how they have voted—and the large number of
universities not near the borders of other states. We categorized philosophers as
ethicists or non-ethicists based on area of specialization information as found on
philosophy department websites. (Philosophers not listing specialization or who
specialized in philosophy of religion or philosophy of action but no other ethics-
related area were counted neither as ethicists nor as non-ethicists.) About half of all
philosophers indicated a specialization in ethics or a subfield of ethics. We collected
samples of political scientists and other professors from political science department
websites and online faculty directories at the same universities, so that the four main
comparison groups (ethicists, non-ethicist philosophers, political scientists, and other
professors) were all about the same size and drawn proportionately from the same
universities. We also noted academic rank (when listed) and whether the professor
was in a research- or teaching-oriented university. (For further methodological
details, see the on-line Appendix.)
We assessed the voting history of each professor by looking for name matches
between the faculty lists and public voting records of people residing within 60 (or
in some cases 50) miles of the university. We excluded from analysis professors with
more than one name match. (This amounted to 14.3% of the listed faculty, with very
similar rates of exclusion among the four groups: χ2, p=.99.) Below, we will discuss
the possible effects of false matches. When a match was found we also noted, when
available from the public records, the voter’s birth year, gender, ethnicity, and
political party. (Again, for details, see the methodological Appendix.)
Not all locations provided equally detailed voting histories (California, in
particular, only provided data for statewide elections), nor were voting opportunities
the same in every location. However, since we balanced the data so that
approximately the same number of ethicists, non-ethicist philosophers, political
scientists, and other professors were drawn from each university, we assume that
local differences wash out; state-by-state differences we will examine below. Our
primary analysis considers professors’ votes per year starting with the year 2000, or
the first year in which a vote is recorded if that year was later than 2000, and
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extending through late 2007 or early 2008, depending on state (in no case including
the 2008 Presidential primary election). While the 2000 cutoff date is arbitrary, it
reflects the fact that some regions’ voting history records extend only back into the
late 1990s.
We recognize that there are some shortcomings in these data: The selection of
states may be unrepresentative (the Northeast, for example, is not included); we
don’t have information about differences in voting opportunities especially in local
elections; and the attempt to match professors’ names with names in voter rolls
necessarily produces some overmatches that have to be discarded as well as some
mismatches. This study is archival, labor-intensive, and limited by available data.
However, it is in our view clearly superior to relying on self-report (as nearly all
previous studies of professors’ voting behavior have done), since it seems to us
likely that pressures distorting self-reports are likely to vary between the groups and
thus be confounded with the variable under study.
2 Results
Overall Voting Rates Overall voting rates by group are shown in Table 1. (These
data include only professors for whom we found a voting history with at least one
recorded vote; for discussion of those with no voting record, see below.) The main
result of our analysis is this: Political scientists voted somewhat more frequently
than other professors (about 10–15% more frequently), while all other groups—
including ethicists and political philosophers—voted at about the same rate. In fact
the trend among tenure-track professors was for ethicists and political philosophers
to vote a little less than the other groups (though the differences in voting rates
among these groups remained within the range of chance variation). In other words,
the data suggest that civic engagement as measured by voting frequency is no higher
among ethicists, including political philosophers, than among professors in general.
Table 1 Mean recorded votes per year by area of specialization; numbers in parentheses include tenure-
track professors only
group mean recorded # of profs with one
votes/year voter match
PHILOSOPHERS 0.98 (0.97) 562 (444)
non-ethicists 1.04 (1.01) 221 (186)
ethicists 0.98 (0.95) 265 (204)
political philosophers 0.99 (0.96) 112 (90)
other ethicists 0.95 (0.94) 153 (114)
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 1.09* (1.10*) 316 (265)
OTHER PROFESSORS 0.93 (0.98) 283 (198)
Asterisks indicate a significant difference (by planned two-tailed t-tests) from the “other professors” group
at an alpha level of .01; ANOVA of ethicists, non-ethicists, political scientists, and other professors,
p<.001
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Before we can draw this conclusion confidently, however, we need to examine the
data for a number of potential shortcomings and confounds. To anticipate: We find
no problems that undermine the main result.
Skew The data are somewhat right-skewed (with the majority of individuals in the
0.25–1.00 range and a minority trailing off into twice a year or more). To correct for
this, we use the positive square root of vote rate for all parametric statistical
analyses. The main findings are the same either way.
Differences by State Due to differences in voting opportunities and state record-
keeping, we found more recorded votes per year for professors in Washington State
than in the other four states. Mean votes per year in Washington was 1.38; in
California, Florida, Minnesota, and North Carolina mean votes per year were 0.96,
0.95, 0.93, and 0.88 respectively (ANOVA p<.001; Tukey pairwise comparisons
finds WA significantly higher than all other states and CA significantly higher
than NC only). This introduces a potential confound into the data, since although
we matched the number of philosophers in every university with approximately
half as many political scientists and other professors at the same university, it
was not possible to control the distribution of ethicists and non-ethicists within
philosophy in the same way; and as it happens, ethicists and non-ethicists were
not equally distributed among the states (χ2=.02; see Table 3 in the Appendix for
raw numbers), with California having the lowest ratio of ethicists to non-ethicists
(0.88) and Washington State the highest (1.71). However, this does not undermine
our findings. As we will note below, regression analyses accounting for state yield
the same result as the main analysis described above. Furthermore, since
Washington State had the highest vote rate, correcting for the uneven distribution
should only make stronger our overall finding that ethicists voted no more often
than non-ethicists.
Ceiling Effects in California We drew almost half our sample from California, for
which we only have data for statewide elections. Professors’ voting rates in these
elections were high by U.S. standards. Among California professors in our database
who were registered to vote in the June 2006 primary election, 60% voted, compared
to 33.6% of registered voters statewide (source: http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections);
among those registered to vote in the November 2006 general election, 82% voted,
compared to 56.2% statewide. Indeed, looking at the six statewide elections in our
data set beginning with 2003, among California professors whose first recorded vote
was in 2003 or earlier, 52% of those on our lists voted in all six elections, and 72%
voted in at least five of the six. Since a majority of professors who voted at all voted
in virtually every statewide election, it’s possible that ceiling effects are flattening
the California data and obscuring potential differences: Ultra-conscientious voters
would look the same in our California database as professors with fairly ordinary
professorial habits. However, this possible flattening cannot explain our overall
findings. Excluding California does not alter the results of our analysis: Political
scientists remain a group apart, while the other groups all voted at essentially the
same rate (ANOVA, p<.001, and planned two-tailed t-tests at an alpha of .01). Since
the other four states include data from local elections, which often have low
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participation rates, ceiling effects are not a problem in those states, with the data
showing a good spread on the right side.
Variance Among the Groups ANOVA analysis assumes that the groups do not
differ in the variance of their scores. We initially thought that political scientists
or political philosophers might show a higher variance in vote rates than other
professors, since extreme views about the importance or pointlessness of voting
may be overrepresented in those groups. However, the variance in the square
roots of the vote rates is virtually identical among the four main groups (pooled
s2=.052, Bartlett’s test, p=.90), and also between political philosophers and other
philosophers (pooled s2=.051, Bartlett’s test, p=.83).
Professors Registered to Vote but with No Recorded Votes Some professors were
matched with a registered voter with no recorded votes. This might reflect recent
registration, failure of the state to match the record with a record at a previous
address, a gap in the data, or a pattern of not voting, and thus is difficult to interpret.
Therefore, these data were excluded from analysis. Fortunately, the rates of name
match with no recorded votes were small and similar among the four groups (6.2%
overall, χ2, p=.60) and so unlikely to be driving any effects. Adding these professors
into the analysis with a vote rate of zero does not change the main findings.
Professors with No Voting Record Found It’s also hard to interpret cases in which no
voting record is found. The person may be a non-voter, but she may instead be
registered to vote under a different name or in a different location, or she may have
recently moved, or she may be a non-citizen or felon and so prohibited from voting.
Nonetheless, it seems desirable to see if the four groups differed in percentage of
professors with no record found. Table 2 presents these results. The difference
between the groups is not statistically significant (χ2, p=.14).
We further examined the trend for non-ethicist philosophers to have fewer records
found than ethicists (two-tailed two-proportion z-test, p=.02, treating the p value
cautiously since the χ2 is not significant). Post-hoc analysis reveals this difference
to be driven almost entirely by professors at research universities (which have a
higher proportion of non-ethicists than do other universities: 39% vs. 60%, two-
tailed, two-proportion z-test, p<.001). We then checked these research professors’
professional and department pages for evidence of excusers from voting. We found
that more than three quarters of the research professors with no matching voter
record were either appointed fewer than two years before the data collection
Table 2 Percentage of professors with no voting record found under their name within 60 miles of their
university (in FL, MN, and WA 50 miles: see Appendix)
group # with no record found % with no record found
ethicists 104 22.4%
non-ethicist philosophers 125 29.1%
political scientists 150 26.2%
other professors 138 26.9%
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(i.e., after 2005), showed evidence of a foreign background, were dead, or were at
least part time in another location. Excluding those faculty eliminates the difference
between ethicists and non-ethicist philosophers. It also suggests that within two
years of moving to a new location over 90% of philosophers at research institutions
who are eligible to vote do register to vote—an impressively high rate compared to
overall U.S. voter registration rates (68% of eligible adults in 2006, according to the
U.S. Census Bureau; source: http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/
voting.html).
Academic Rank Academic rank is a confounding variable. Academic rank correlates
with voting rate (using non-tenure track, Assistant Professor, Associate Professor,
and full Professor as four ranked categories, ρ=0.18, p<.001), and the four main
groups differ in the distribution of academic ranks (χ2, p<.001), mainly because the
“other professors” category has a lower percentage of tenure-track faculty. (This may
reflect either a real difference in rank distribution or a tendency for non-tenure track
faculty to be listed in university directories at a higher rate than on departments’
websites.) To correct for this, we excluded from analysis non-tenure-track faculty
and faculty with no rank indicated. With this exclusion, there is no statistically
detectable difference in rank between the four main groups (χ2, p=.06, with a trend
toward higher rank among philosophers). The results of the analysis are virtually the
same as without the exclusion: See the parenthetical data in Table 1. However,
because of this confound, the remaining analyses include only tenure-track
professors.
Age, Ethnicity, Gender, and Political Party Political scientists have generally found
that older people, Caucasians, women, and Republicans vote more frequently than
younger people, ethnic minorities, men, and Democrats (see Abramson et al. 2007;
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting.html). Fortunately, none of
these variables appear to confound our data. In contrast with the national data, the
male and female professors on our lists voted at the same rate (square root of rate
0.98 vs. 0.98, two-tailed t-test, p=.82), as did Democrats and Republicans (0.98 vs.
0.96, two-tailed t-test, p=.40, no data from Minnesota or Washington State).
Therefore, although the distributions of women and Republicans differed among the
four groups (χ2, p=.002, p=.006; with non-ethicist philosophers both the most male
and the least Republican), those differences are unlikely to be distorting our findings.
In accord with national data, older professors voted more frequently than younger
ones (r=0.14, p<.001). Fortunately for our analysis, the four groups did not differ in
mean age (ANOVA, p=.10, with a trend for political scientists to be younger). Also in
accord with national data, self-described ethnic minorities (only North Carolina and
Florida provided these data) voted less frequently than self-described non-Hispanic
Caucasians (square root of vote rate 0.83 vs. 0.96, p=.03). We have no evidence that
ethnicity differs significantly between the groups (χ2, p=.39); however, since the
number of self-described minorities is tiny—only 26 professors!—we cannot draw
definite conclusions.
Incidentally, in accord with research on gender distribution in philosophy
(Haslanger 2008), tenure-track philosophers overall were 77% male, with positive
correlations between gender and age (r=.15, p=.002) and gender and rank (ρ=.16,
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p<.001). However, a regression predicting philosophers’ rank on the basis of age
and gender together shows gender to be only marginally predictive of rank (p=.06).
Our findings also support the widespread finding that U.S. academics tend to be
Democrats (Ladd and Lipset 1976; Klein and Western 2004–5; Gross and Simmons
2007). Among tenure-track philosophy professors with a recorded party affiliation
(83.6% of professors matched with voting records in CA, FL, or NC), 88% were
Democrats, 7% were Republicans, and 5% identified with a minor party. Among
political scientists the percentages were 80%, 14%, and 5%; among the other
professors 80%, 19%, and 2%.
Institution Type Professors at research-oriented institutions voted at the same rate as
professors at teaching-oriented institutions (square root of rate 0.99 vs. 0.97, p=.39),
so although a smaller percentage of philosophers at research institutions were
ethicists than at teaching institutions (39% vs. 60%, two-tailed two-proportion z-test,
p<.001), this difference, too, is unlikely to be affecting the comparisons.
Name Frequency and City of Residence We were concerned that there may be a
substantial number of false matches—cases with no local voting record for the
professor but a voting record for exactly one other person of the same full first and
last name (and middle initial or name when known) within 60 miles of the university
(or in some cases 50 miles; see Appendix). To test the possibility that false matches
may be driving the results, we compared the voting rates of professors with common
names and those with rare names (those names such that only one voter in the state
had that last name and first initial), on the assumption that false matches would be
less likely for professors with rare names. Professors with rare names were slightly
more likely to vote than those with common names (square root of rate 1.00 vs. 0.97,
two-tailed t-test, p=.04). Since voting rates among professors are considerably
higher than in the general population, this result is consistent with occasional false
matches dragging down the voting rates of professors with common names.
However, since the effect size is small and since the groups did not differ in the
distribution of common names (χ2, p=.38), it’s unlikely that false matches are
having much effect on the main comparisons. Very similar remarks apply to the
comparison between professors with their name matches in the same city that houses
the university and those with their name matches in farther cities (square root of rate
1.00 vs. 0.95, p=.006, χ2, p=.19).
Multiple Regression A standard multiple regression analysis accounting simulta-
neously for all the potentially confounding factors discussed above is not possible
due to the fact that the great majority of records have at least one missing data point.
However, enough data exist for a meaningful regression analysis that takes into
account age, academic rank, gender, institution type, state of residence (treating
California as the reference group and excluding North Carolina which did not provide
age data), and group (treating the “other professors” as the reference group).
Confirming our main analysis, specialization in political science is a significant
predictor (coefficient=.065, p=.003) and specialization in ethics and specialization in
non-ethics philosophy are not predictive (p=.77, p=.18). Also predictive is residence
in Washington State (coefficient=.188, p<.001), birth year (coefficient=−.0030,
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p<.001), and academic rank (coefficient=.022, p=.008), but not institution type,
gender, residence in Florida, or residence in Minnesota. A separate regression
excluding age and including North Carolina yields similar results, with residence in
North Carolina negatively predictive (coefficient=−.044, p=.04).
3 Conclusion
Ethicists and political philosophers vote no more often than other professors.
Apparently, neither the general philosophical moral reflection practiced by ethicists
nor the more particular philosophical reflection about democratic institutions
practiced by U.S. political philosophers has a positive influence on voting frequency.
The latter is especially striking in light of our finding that political scientists vote
more frequently than other professors. Political scientists presumably vote more
frequently either because of a greater sensitivity to citizens’ responsibility to vote or
because of a greater personal interest in politics (either of these might be either a
cause or effect of specialization in political science); one might have thought that
political philosophers would share those tendencies.
We also find it interesting that all the groups under study showed the same
variance in voting rates. We had expected that there would be a wider spread of
views about the value of voting among political scientists and political philosophers
than among other professors. Either there is no such wider spread of views or that
wider spread of views does not reveal itself in actual voting behavior.
We hope that the results of this study, when combined with other results, will help
clarify the relationship between moral reflection and moral behavior. The simplest
interpretation of this study is that moral reflection has no effect on behavior.
However, we hesitate to draw this conclusion. It may be that we are wrong about the
moral importance of voting regularly. It may be that voting behavior correlates
poorly with overall moral behavior. (Probably so. But we doubt any tractable
measures for this population correlate much better, which is why we aim for multiple
measures.) As we continue to collect data, we hope a general pattern will emerge.
Perhaps we will find ethicists to behave better, but only on a narrow range of
practical issues very tightly related to their professional interests; or perhaps a certain
amount of philosophical moral reflection proves beneficial while too much proves
harmful. It may turn out that people drawn to careers in ethics profit from
philosophical moral reflection but have a counterbalancing lack of other prods to
moral behavior. Philosophical moral reflection might prove virtually inert, or it
might provide a random push away from conventional morality, or it might prove
morally helpful in some contexts and harmful in others. The theoretical possibilities
are various. Given the paucity of data, we think it premature to draw general
conclusions.
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